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Georgetown Journal of International Law 
Dawn C. Nunziatoa1 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF INTERNET FREEDOM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It was long assumed that the Internet would bring about greater opportunities for free expression than any other medium. In 
recent years, however, the Internet has increasingly become a tool of censorship, as scores of countries around the world have 
imposed nationwide filtering regimes to block their citizens’ access to various types of Internet speech that they deem 
harmful. Instead of trending toward greater freedom, the Internet is now trending toward greater censorship and control, as 
many countries--including democracies such as the United Kingdom--are seeking to exercise greater and greater control over 
this medium.1 Today, more than forty countries--in addition to the usual suspects like China, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea--
have implemented nationwide filtering of speech on the Internet, and this number is growing.2 Among democracies, the 
United Kingdom and Australia are leading the way in implementing filters to attempt to control their citizens’ access to 
harmful content. Indeed, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced in July that mandatory “family-friendly” filters 
will be imposed by default on all new computers by the end of 2013.3 By the end of 2014, such filters will be imposed by 
default on all existing computers as well, creating a virtual tyranny of the default.4 Such extensive mandatory filtering builds 
on the solid foundation of the United Kingdom’s comprehensive system for filtering and blocking harmful Internet content 
through the mechanisms set in motion by an entity known as the Internet Watch Foundation. The United Kingdom’s 
experience is paralleled by similar events in Australia. For much of 2012, the Australian government attempted to introduce 
mandatory internet service provide (ISP)-level filtering of certain content, requiring all Australian ISPs to block content 
dealing with “matters of sex, drug misuse or addiction, crime, cruelty, violence or revolting or abhorrent phenomena in such 
a way that they offend against the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults.”5 
Although political considerations caused this plan to be formally withdrawn, it is likely that Australia will remain in the 
business of Internet filtering for the foreseeable future.6 In short, liberal democratic regimes, as well as authoritarian regimes, 
are now implementing unprecedented restrictions on Internet content and changing the face of Internet freedom. 
Nationwide Internet filtering has become a powerful tool for many governments to control the content that their citizens are 
able to access. Given the extent and increasing effectiveness of efforts to censor Internet speech throughout the world, 
protectors of Internet free speech can no longer rest comfortably on the assurance given by Internet pioneer John Gilmore two 
decades ago that “the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”7 Although free speech advocates broadly 
denounce such censorship, it is likely that many countries--having seized upon these powerful tools of control--will continue 
to restrict Internet content to prohibit their citizens from accessing speech that they deem to be harmful. 
It is commonly understood--and understandable--that different countries around the world adopt different definitions of what 
speech is protected and what speech is unprotected, online as well as offline. Given, for example, European countries’ 
horrific experiences with the Holocaust, it is not surprising that some of these countries consider racial and religious hate 
speech to be unprotected. While there is substantial divergence on the substantive contours of free speech protections8--which 
categories of speech are protected and which are not--there is some convergence among nations regarding procedural 
protections for speech.9 These procedural protections are inherent in and flow from widely-shared concepts of fundamental 
due process, and have been embodied in the widely-adopted International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the 
ICCPR), as recently construed by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression to provide procedural protections for Internet speech.10 A second important source of procedural 
protections for Internet speech is the Anglo-American tradition’s hostility toward prior restraints on speech and (relative) 
preference for subsequent punishment as a means of restricting expression. Over the past four hundred years, Anglo-
American jurisprudence has developed a presumption against the legality of any prior censorship or prior restraints on 
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expression and has imposed a set of procedural safeguards that must be in place before any system of prior restraint can be 
legally imposed.11 The nationwide filtering systems that have become increasingly pervasive in the past few years embody 
prior restraints on speech--restrictions on speech imposed prior to a judicial determination of the speech’s illegality12--and 
fail to accord these important procedural protections for speech embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and in Anglo-American free speech jurisprudence. Nationwide filtering systems should either be jettisoned or revised 
so as to accord these fundamental procedural protections on speech. 
In Part II, this Article focuses on the nationwide filtering systems espoused by the United Kingdom. Part III analyzes the 
procedural protections on free speech that have been articulated both under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and within the U.S. legal tradition, especially with respect to prior restraints on speech. In Part IV, the Article 
compares the procedural protections provided under the United Kingdom’s Internet filtering system with the protections 
required within U.S. jurisprudence and the ICCPR, and finds this nationwide filtering system to be lacking. I propose 
modifications to this system and suggest that if nationwide filtering systems are to be imposed, certain procedural safeguards 
must be implemented within any such system--especially those that are imposed within liberal democracies. 
A. The United Kingdom’s Expanding Nationwide Filtering System 
Journey with us to a state where an unaccountable panel of censors vets 95 per cent of citizens’ domestic 
internet connections. The content coming into each home is checked against a mysterious blacklist by a group 
overseen by nobody, which keeps secret the list of censored URLs not just from citizens, but from internet 
service providers themselves. And until recently, few in that country even knew the body existed. Are we in 
China? Iran? Saudi Arabia? No-- the United Kingdom ....13 
To understand what is at stake in a nationwide filtering system like that adopted--and soon to be expanded--in the United 
Kingdom, and how the system implicates the rights of Internet users, consider the operation of a filtering scheme translated to 
the real space context. Imagine a vast real space forum for authors and readers in which millions of authors bring their books 
to be made available for billions of potentially interested readers. The authors place their books on the bookshelves of the 
forum and then depart. Billions of readers also come to the forum to search for books of potential interest to them. 
Unbeknownst to either the authors or the readers, before the content of any book is made available to the readers--or at some 
point after the books are placed on the bookshelves--the books are scrutinized by unseen and unknown censors to determine 
whether the content is “permissible,” according to some criteria that are unstated and undiscoverable. If these censors 
determine that a book or some of its content is impermissible, it is placed on a blacklist and removed from circulation. When 
the readers enter the forum to search for books of potential interest to them, they do not know which books have been 
removed, nor do the authors of the banned books ever learn whether (or why) their books have been removed. This scenario 
replicates in real space what occurs in cyberspace under a nationwide filtering system like that in operation in the United 
Kingdom when websites are placed on blacklists and the country’s Internet users are prohibited from accessing such content. 
In July 2013, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron surprised the world by announcing that “family-friendly” filters would 
soon be imposed by default on all computers in the nation.14 Such filters would affect both wireline and wireless Internet 
access.15 Cameron offered no details as to how the filters would work or exactly which categories of speech they would 
attempt to block--other than that ISPs themselves would administer the program.16 If, as is likely, the new nationwide filtering 
system replicates the system already in place affecting mobile Internet access, it is likely that the following categories of 
content will be blocked by default: pornography, violent material, extremist and terrorist related content, anorexia and eating 
disorder websites, suicide related websites, alcohol, smoking, web forums, esoteric material, and, of course, web blocking 
circumvention tools.17 Cameron did not offer any details about what remedies could be taken by citizens if legal material is 
mistakenly blocked by such filters, about which entities would be responsible for creating such filters and determining which 
websites fell under the prohibited categories, or about whether such entities would be accountable to the public in any way.18 
This new and comprehensive initiative to impose extensive filters on the nation’s Internet access builds upon the United 
Kingdom’s pre-existing nationwide filtering system, which already affects 99% of its residential Internet subscribers.19 This 
system, implemented in 1996, blocks access to websites containing certain types of content that are deemed “potentially 
illegal” by an unaccountable organization known as the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF).20 Below, this Article describes the 
evolution of the IWF, the development of the United Kingdom’s initial nationwide filtering system, and some of the 
difficulties posed by this system, and by the proposed expansion of this system. 
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In 1996, as concerns arose about illegal content being hosted and facilitated by ISPs in the United Kingdom, the U.K. 
Department of Trade and Industry facilitated discussions between the Metropolitan Police, the Home Office, and a group of 
ISPs with an eye toward remedying these concerns.21 These discussions resulted in an agreement whereby a private, 
charitable organization, the Internet Watch Foundation, was formed and charged with policing the Internet for child 
pornography.22 In 1999, after three years of the IWF’s operation, the U.K. government and Department of Trade and Industry 
evaluated and ultimately endorsed the operations of the IWF.23 The IWF is currently responsible for policing and facilitating 
the filtering or blocking of at least two types of potentially illegal content: (1) child sexual abuse content hosted anywhere in 
the world (child pornography); and (2) criminally obscene content (“extreme pornography”) hosted in the United Kingdom.24 
The IWF monitors and polices the Internet’s content by operating a hotline reporting system, through which U.K. Internet 
users alert the IWF to such potentially illegal content that they have come across on the Internet.25 The IWF then employs a 
handful of analysts trained by police to review flagged websites to analyze whether they contain “potentially illegal 
content.”26 If an IWF analyst determines that a website is ““potentially illegal,” she will include the URL for that website on 
the IWF blacklist.27 The blacklist, which contains between 500 and 800 sites at any given time and is updated twice daily, is 
maintained in secret.28 Approximately 99% of all domestic broadband connections are filtered in compliance with the IWF 
blacklist, and the U.K. government is actively working to secure 100% compliance.29 
In the words of commentator Lilian Edwards, the United Kingdom’s implementation of the IWF blacklist “could be the most 
perfectly invisible censorship mechanism ever invented.”30 First, the system does not provide meaningful notice on a 
consistent basis of instances of blocking to either the end-user or the content provider whose content is filtered or blocked. 
Depending upon the method of implementation employed by an ISP, the end-user may or may not receive any indication that 
the website he or she has requested has been blocked in compliance with the IWF blacklist or the reason for such blocking.31 
Some ISPs, such as British Telecom and Virgin Media, simply return a generic HTTP “404 Not Found” error message when 
a user requests access to a site that is on the IWF blacklist.32 This error message does not give the requesting user any 
indication that the requested page has been blocked or the reason why the page has been blocked.33 In contrast, other ISPs, 
such as Demon, return a HTTP “403 Forbidden” error message, which at least provides some indication to the requesting 
Internet user that the requested site has been blocked because it is “forbidden.”34 The IWF itself does not require that any type 
of notice be provided to the content provider that its site has been blocked or to the end-user requesting such content.35 
Second, the filtering system does not provide for a method of appeal for an independent judicial determination of whether the 
blocked content is in fact illegal. The IWF website indicates that “any party with a legitimate association with the 
[blacklisted] content ... who believes they are being prevented from accessing legal content may appeal against the accuracy 
of an assessment.”36 The appeal procedure provided by the IWF, however, does not contemplate judicial review. Rather, the 
contemplated appeal merely involves a second look by the IWF itself with no input from or representation of the affected 
content provider or end user, and following that, a review by a police agency, whose assessment is final.37 Further, as 
discussed above, it is unclear in many cases how a party would learn that the content she was seeking, or seeking to make 
available, was subject to the IWF’s blacklist, since the IWF does not require that notice be provided to the affected parties. 
In summary, the United Kingdom’s nationwide filtering system based on the IWF blacklist operates as an opaque, non-
transparent system that does not provide end-users or content providers with meaningful notice that a potentially illegal 
website has been blocked. The system operates so as to place ultimate authority over Internet content in an unaccountable, 
nontransparent body. Not surprisingly, this has led to instances of overblocking.38 Although it is difficult to secure meaningful 
information regarding how many sites on the IWF’s blacklist are actually illegal, some clear instances of IWF overblocking 
have become subject to public scrutiny, as I discuss below.39 
In December 2008, acting on a hotline notification from an Internet user, the IWF placed a Wikipedia article discussing an 
album by the popular German rock band The Scorpions (of “Rock You Like a Hurricane” fame) on its blacklist.40 The cover 
of The Scorpions’ 1976 album Virgin Killer depicted a pre-pubescent girl unclothed, but with her genitalia obscured from 
view. The IWF had determined that the cover art was “potentially illegal,” and placed the Wikipedia article discussing the 
album on its blacklist, without notifying the content provider of its decision to blacklist the website.41 As a result, the vast 
majority of U.K. residential users was unable to access this content and was not informed as to why the content was 
blocked.42 
As a result of the general public awareness and outcry regarding the consequences of the IWF’s blocking of the Virgin Killer 
page, the IWF removed the page from its blacklist but nonetheless maintained that the image of the album cover was 
potentially illegal.43 As Mike Godwin, General Counsel for Wikimedia, explained, “When we first protested the block, [the 
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IWF’s] response was, ‘We’ve now conducted an appeals process on your behalf and you’ve lost the appeal.’ When I asked 
who exactly represented the Wikimedia Foundation’s side in that appeals process, they were silent. It was only after the fact 
of their blacklist and its effect on U.K. citizens were publicised that the IWF appears to have felt compelled to relent.”44 
In January 2009, in another incident of massive overblocking, U.K. Internet users learned that all 85 billion pages of the 
Wayback Machine--the application that archives the Internet’s content--had been blocked, apparently because the archive 
contained one or more URLs that were on the IWF’s blacklist.45 
Most recently, in November 2011, the implementation of the IWF blacklist blocked U.K. subscribers of the ISP Virgin Media 
from accessing any files from the popular Fileserve file-hosting service--one of the ten most popular file-sharing sites on the 
Internet--which allows users to store and share files in the cloud.46 IWF apparently intended to blacklist only certain Fileserve 
URLs, but the effect of its placing these URLs on its blacklist (as the blacklist was implemented by Virgin Media) was to 
block any and all files from being downloaded from Fileserve.47 After this latest instance of overblocking by ISPs pursuant to 
IWF’s blacklist, Jim Killock--head of online rights activists the Open Rights Group--noted that the accidental blocking of 
legitimate content has become “quite a common occurrence.”48 
Under Prime Minister Cameron’s plan for expanded “family friendly” Internet filtering, a far wider range of websites will be 
blocked than the categories of child pornography and extreme pornography that are currently blocked under the IWF filtering 
system.49 Cameron’s filtering plan fundamentally shifts the default of Internet usage towards censorship, presenting serious 
problems for freedom of expression in the U.K., as discussed in greater detail in Part III. 
II. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR SPEECH
A. International Procedural Protections for Speech 
International treaties and documents of international law provide protections for speech that must be respected in the context 
of nationwide Internet filtering systems.50 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),51 which has been 
adopted by 167 parties (including the United Kingdom), and is considered a binding international law treaty, provides in its 
Article 19 that: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice.52 
3. [These rights] may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by
law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.53 
The right to freedom of expression is also protected under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 
which has been signed by 47 nations (including the United Kingdom), is considered binding, and is enforced by the European 
Court of Human Rights.54 Article 10 of the European Convention provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers .... 
The exercise of these freedoms ... may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
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prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.55 
 
These international protections for free speech not only have a substantive dimension of which categories of speech to protect 
and which to restrict--which differ from country to country56--but such protections also have important procedural 
dimensions, which require that “sensitive tools” be implemented to distinguish between protected and unprotected speech.57 
As free speech theorist Henry Monaghan explains, “procedural guarantees play an equally large role in protecting freedom of 
speech; indeed, they ‘assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.”’58 
  
While there is substantial variation in the substantive protections for speech, there is more widespread agreement regarding 
the procedures that are essential to ensure protection for the categories of speech that are deemed legal. These procedural 
requirements were recently articulated in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/17/27,59 and were expanded upon in a recent decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights. While recognizing that countries enjoy some discretion to restrict speech that constitutes child 
pornography, hate speech, defamation, incitement to genocide, discrimination, hostility or violence, the Special Rapporteur’s 
Report explains that: 
Any [such] limitation to the right to freedom of expression must pass the following [multi]-part, cumulative 
test: 
(a) It must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible to everyone (principles of predictability and 
transparency); and 
(b) It must pursue one of the purposes set out in article 19, paragraph 3, of the [International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights], namely (i) to protect the rights or reputations of others, or (ii) to protect national security 
or of public order, or of public health or morals (principle of legitimacy); and 
(c) It must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive means required to achieve the purported aim 
(principles of necessity and proportionality)[;] 
  
  
[It] must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted 
influences in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against abuse, 
including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its abusive application.60 
  
  
The case of Yildirim v. Turkey,61 decided by the European Court of Human Rights in December 2012, was the first to consider 
the issue of Internet censorship through the lens of the procedural protections for speech articulated in the Special 
Rapporteur’s report. In that case, Mr. Yildirim, an Turkish graduate student and blogger, challenged the Turkish 
government’s blocking of his academic website on Google Sites (a platform for creation and hosting of websites).62 The 
Turkish government had ordered the entire platform of Google Sites to be blocked within Turkey during the prosecution of 
another Google Sites webpage containing content allegedly insulting to modern Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.63 
Even after the case against the offending Google Site had been dropped, Mr. Yildirim’s content on Google Sites--as well as 
all other Google Sites content--remained blocked indefinitely in Turkey.64 After having his application dismissed by Turkish 
courts, Mr. Yildirim petitioned the European Court of Human Rights, which unanimously found that Turkey had violated 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in ordering the indefinite blocking of all content available on 
Google Sites.65 In his concurring opinion, Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque explained that “blocking orders imposed on 
sites and platforms ... [are] pure censorship.”66 Building upon the procedural protections for speech set forth in the Special 
Rapporteur’s Report, Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque set forth minimum procedural protections that any nationwide 
blocking or filtering of Internet content must embody: 
The minimum criteria for Convention-compatible legislation on Internet blocking measures are: 
(1) a definition of the categories of persons and institutions liable to have their publications blocked ...; 
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(2) a definition of the categories of blocking orders, such as blocking of entire websites, IP addresses, ports, 
network protocols or types of use, like social networking; 
(3) a provision on the territorial ambit of the blocking order, which may have region-wide, nationwide, or even 
worldwide effect; 
(4) a limit on the duration of the blocking order; 
(5) an indication of the “interests” ... that may justify the blocking order 
(6) observance of the criterion of proportionality, which provides for a fair balancing of freedom of expression 
and the competing ““interests” pursued ...; 
(7) compliance with the principle of necessity, which enables an assessment to be made as to whether the 
interference with freedom of expression adequately advances the “interests” pursued and goes no further than is 
necessary to meet the said “social need”; 
(8) definition of the authorities competent to issue a reasoned blocking order; 
(9) a procedure to be followed for the issuance of that order, which includes the examination by the competent 
authority of the case file supporting the request for a blocking order and the hearing of evidence from the 
affected person or institution ...; 
(10) notification of the blocking order and the grounds for it to the person or institution affected; and 
(11) a judicial appeal procedure against the blocking order.67 
 
Because none of these procedural protections for speech were provided in the Yildirim case, Judge Paulo Pinto de 
Albuquerque concluded that the Convention’s protections for freedom of expression were violated.68 
  
B. United States Procedural Protections for Speech 
Within the context of United States First Amendment jurisprudence, courts have also constructed a powerful “body of 
procedural law which defines the manner in which they and other bodies must evaluate and resolve [free speech] claims--a 
[free speech] ‘due process,’ if you will.”69 In particular, courts have applied stringent procedural safeguards in scrutinizing 
prior restraints on speech--restraints on speech that are imposed prior to a judicial determination of the speech’s illegality.70 In 
so doing, courts developed “a comprehensive system of ‘procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a 
censorship system.”’71 
  
The prohibition against prior restraints has been a foundational principle of freedom of expression in the Anglo-American 
tradition.72 In William Blackstone’s Commentaries, “Freedom of the Press” is defined simply as the right to be free from prior 
restraints.73 In his Commentaries, Blackstone explained that “the liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free 
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter 
when published.”74 Indeed, following Blackstone, some have argued that the sole purpose of the First Amendment was to 
foreclose in the United States any system of prior restraint such as was embodied in the English censorship system.75 
  
In order to restrict harmful speech, governments might choose the methods of prior restraints, such as those imposed via the 
types of filtering systems discussed above, or subsequent punishment, such as by criminally prosecuting content providers 
who make available harmful speech, for example, under obscenity or child pornography statutes. Regulations that proceed 
via subsequent punishment provide vastly greater procedural protections for speech and are likely to be implemented in ways 
that are far more speech-protective than regulations embodying the method of prior restraints. As pre-eminent First 
Amendment theorist Thomas Emerson explains, systems of prior restraint are likely to operate in a manner that is much more 
hostile toward free speech than systems of subsequent punishment, for a number of reasons.76 First, Emerson explains, 
systems of prior restraint are prone to adverse decisions.77 Such systems are constructed as to make it easier, and more likely, 
that the censor will rule adversely to free expression.78 As Emerson argues, “[an] official thinks longer and harder before 
deciding to undertake the serious task of subsequent punishment .... Under a system of prior restraint, he can reach the result 
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by a simple stroke of the pen. Thus, [in the case of subsequent punishment], the burden of initial action falls upon the 
government; in the other, on the citizen .... For these and similar reasons, a decision to suppress in advance is usually more 
readily reached, on the same facts, than a decision to punish after the event.”79 
  
Second, under a system of prior restraint, the issue whether to suppress expression is determined by an administrative 
procedure, instead of via criminal procedure.80 Accordingly, “the procedural protections built around the criminal 
prosecution--many of which are constitutional guarantees-- are not applicable to prior restraint. The presumption of 
innocence, the heavier burden of proof borne by the government, the stricter rules of evidence, the stronger objection to 
vagueness, the immeasurably tighter and more technical procedure--all these are not on the side of free expression when its 
fate is decided.”81 
  
Third, within a system of prior restraints, the decision to restrict speech rests with a single administrator or functionary 
instead of with a judge and/or jury.82 Both judge and jury function to provide important safeguards against abuses of power 
and are designed to secure independent and objective judgments. Such safeguards are not necessarily present within an 
administrative system implementing prior restraints.83 
  
Fourth, systems of prior restraint are more likely to operate out of the public view and in such a manner that they are hidden 
from public scrutiny, appraisal, and accountability.84 In contrast, subsequent punishments take place in the glare of public 
scrutiny and accountability. As Emerson explains, 
 
[In systems of prior restraint,] decisions are less likely to be made in the glare of publicity that accompanies a 
subsequent punishment. The policies and actions of the licensing official do not as often come to public notice; 
the reasons for his action are less likely to be known or publicly debated; material for study and criticism are 
less readily available; and the whole apparatus of public scrutiny fails to play the role it normally does under a 
system of subsequent punishment .... [T]he preservation of civil liberties must rest upon an informed and active 
public opinion. Any device that draws a cloak over restrictions on free expression seriously undermines the 
democratic process.”85 
  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the institutional framework in which systems of prior restraint operate are such that 
they favor suppression of expression. As Emerson argues, 
 
The function of the censor is to censor .... He is often acutely responsive to interests which demand suppression 
... and not so well attuned to the forces that support free expression .... The long history of prior restraints 
reveals over and over again that the personal and institutional forces inherent in the system [of prior restraints] 
nearly always end in ... unnecessary, and extreme suppression.86 
 
These considerations make clear that the historical opposition to systems of prior restraint are not arbitrary historical 
accidents, but follow clearly from the importance of according meaningful protections for free expression. 
  
Even though the restraints on speech implemented under a nationwide filtering plan like the IWF’s notice and take-down 
system are not imposed before the speech is made available in the first instance, such restraints still embody the dangers of 
prior restraints.87 Prior restraints are typically imposed ex ante, via pre-publication licensing schemes, as occur in the context 
of motion picture censorship boards.88 Yet, prior restraints can also be imposed midstream, after initial circulation but 
sometime before a judicial determination that the speech is illegal has been made, such as with nationwide internet filtering 
systems.89 Indeed, Internet filtering systems work from evolving blacklists of websites that are maintained in response to tips 
or complaints from Internet users.90 Because midstream prior restraints are imposed prior to a judicial determination of the 
content’s illegality, they are also constitutionally suspect. 
  
The U.S. Supreme Court considered and struck down an example of midstream prior restraints in the case of Bantam Books, 
Inc. v. Sullivan.91 In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth was charged with 
investigating and recommending prosecution of booksellers for the distribution of printed works that were obscene or 
indecent.92 The Commission reviewed books and magazines after they were already in circulation, and notified distributors in 
cases in which a book or magazine had been distributed that the Commission found objectionable.93 In reviewing the 
constitutionality of this scheme, the Supreme Court held that, even though the restrictions on publication were imposed after 
initial circulation and distribution, the Commission’s actions nonetheless effectuated an unconstitutional prior restraint.94 The 
Court explained that “the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for .... sensitive tools” and reiterated its 
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insistence that regulations of speech “scrupulously embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards.”95 The Court observed 
that, under the scheme at issue, “the publisher or distributor is not even entitled to notice and hearing before his publications 
are listed by the Commission as objectionable” and that there was “no provision whatever for judicial superintendence before 
notices issue or even for judicial review of the Commission’s determinations of objectionableness.”96 The Court concluded 
that, in the context of this system of midstream prior restraint, the “procedures of the Commission are radically deficient” and 
unconstitutional.97 
  
III. THE PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS OF CURRENT INTERNET FILTERING SYSTEMS 
The procedural framework set forth in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/17/27, as espoused in the recent European Court of Human Rights decision, and 
by the United States Supreme Court for assessing the legality of prior restraints provides a helpful starting point for assessing 
state-imposed filtering of Internet content.98 Translated into the context of nationwide filtering or blocking of Internet speech, 
these safeguards require, at a minimum (1) that the filtering system provide Internet users with the opportunity to appeal any 
such blocking decisions, to a judicial body and in an expeditious manner; (2) that the filtering scheme operate in an open and 
transparent manner, such that affected Internet users and content providers are provided with notice that the content was 
filtered and the reason for such filtering; and (3) that any filtering be imposed subject to clear and precise definitions of the 
speech to be regulated.99 These procedural requirements are imposed in addition to the general requirements under both the 
ICCPR and the First Amendment that any content-based restrictions on speech (which Internet filters generally embody) 
satisfy strict judicial scrutiny and embody the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.100 These 
procedures do not themselves dictate what categories of speech are deemed harmful or dangerous and as such do not interfere 
with the prerogative of each state to make such substantive determinations. Rather, they impose meaningful, process-based 
safeguards on the implementation of restrictions of whatever categories of speech are deemed harmful or dangerous by each 
nation. Such procedures and sensitive tools for protecting free speech are as important as the substantive protections 
themselves, as “[t]he history of freedom is, in no small part, the history of procedure.”101 In protecting our free speech rights, 
courts have constructed a powerful body of procedural law which defines the manner in which they and other bodies must 
evaluate and resolve free speech claims. 
  
A. Ability to Challenge Decision to Filter Content 
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as construed in the Special Rapporteur’s Report, and U.S. prior 
restraint jurisprudence require that any filtering decision be subject to meaningful challenge before an impartial decision-
maker.102 In construing the ICCPR, the Special Rapporteur explains that: 
 
[A]ny legislation restricting the right to freedom of expression must be applied ... with adequate safeguards 
against abuse, including the possibility of challenge [before an independent body] and remedy against its 
abusive application.103 
 
Building upon this requirement, the European Court of Human Rights in its recent Yildirim decision set forth the requirement 
that any legislation mandating Internet blocking or filtering embody, at a minimum, a judicial appeal procedure.104 
  
Similarly, U.S. courts have consistently emphasized the importance of the availability of prompt judicial review affording 
parties notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding censorship determinations in the prior restraint context.105 As the 
Supreme Court explained, “because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity 
to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final [prior] 
restraint.”106 In order for a nationwide filtering system to effectuate a legal prior restraint, such a system must provide for an 
opportunity to secure judicial review of a censorship decision. 
  
Attempts within the U.S. to filter Internet speech at the ISP level have been deemed unconstitutional because they have failed 
to provide for prompt judicial review of the decision to censor.107 In the Center for Democracy and Technology v. Pappert,108 
for example, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sought to combat online child pornography by enacting the Internet Child 
Pornography Act, which required ISPs serving Pennsylvanians to block access to websites believed to be associated with 
child pornography. The Act permitted the Pennsylvania Attorney General or Pennsylvania district attorneys to seek an ex 
parte court order requiring an ISP to remove or disable access to items accessible through the ISP’s service, upon a showing 
of probable cause that the item constituted child pornography.109 The Act did not require an actual, final judicial 
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determination that the material to be removed actually constituted child pornography before it was placed on the blacklist.110 
In consultation with the affected ISPs, the Attorney General’s office decided to implement the Act by proceeding without 
even securing ex parte court orders.111 Instead, it provided “Informal Notices of Child Pornography” to ISPs that hosted 
websites, initially reported by an agent or a citizen, that the Office of the Attorney General found to contain suspected child 
pornography.112 The Informal Notice directed the ISP to remove or disable Pennsylvania citizens’ access to the suspected 
material within five days of receipt of the Notice.113 
  
The statute was challenged, inter alia, as an unconstitutional prior restraint lacking the requisite procedural safeguards.114 In 
defense of the statute, the attorney general explained that only material that its office had probable cause to believe 
constituted child pornography was requested to be removed.115 The court found that the probable cause showing did not save 
the statute (nor did the fact that the attorney general only issued “Informal Notices” not court orders, and that the process was 
therefore ““voluntary” not coercive116). First, the court explained that in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s exacting 
procedural requirements for prior restraints, to be constitutional, a prior restraint must be imposed by a judicial determination 
in an adversary proceeding.117 The attorney general’s determination that there was probable cause that the material was illegal 
was insufficient.118 Further, even an ex parte judicial determination that the material was illegal would not suffice to impose a 
constitutional final prior restraint because it did not result from an adversarial proceeding.119 As the Supreme Court explained 
in Freedman, “only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of 
expression.”120 Ex parte judicial determinations that are made in the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard on the 
part of the adversely affected speaker are constitutionally deficient, and ex parte nonjudicial determinations are 
constitutionally deficient by an even greater measure.121 
  
Under filtering systems implemented in countries like the United Kingdom, provisions do exist for some sort of appeal of the 
censorship decision.122 However, such provisions for appeal generally do not provide for judicial determination and instead 
merely provide for a second look by the administrative body that made the censorship determination in the first place.123 In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the IWF website indicates that “any party with a legitimate association with the 
[blacklisted] content ... who believes they are being prevented from accessing legal content may appeal against the accuracy 
of an assessment.”124 The appeal procedure provided by the IWF, however, does not contemplate judicial review. Rather, the 
procedure for appeal involves a second look by the IWF itself and, following that, a review by a police agency whose 
assessment is final.125 Further, such appeal procedures do not provide for the opportunity to be heard by the adversely affected 
parties.126 As the General Counsel for Wikimedia explained regarding the IWF’s review of its decision to blacklist the 
Scorpion’s Wikipedia page, “When we first protested the block, [the IWF’s] response was, ‘We’ve now conducted an appeals 
process on your behalf and you’ve lost the appeal.’ When I asked who exactly represented the Wikimedia Foundation’s side 
in that appeals process, they were silent.”127 The IWF’s provisions for appeal--because they do not provide for a judicial 
determination of the affected parties’ rights--fail to accord the requisite protections for freedom of expression. 
  
B. Meaningful Notice to Affected Internet Users 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as construed by Special Rapporteur, as well as U.S. prior restraint 
jurisprudence, require that individuals affected by nationwide filtering systems must at a minimum be made aware of such a 
decision to filter so that they can effectively challenge such actions.128 The right to meaningfully challenge a filtering 
decision, discussed above, presupposes that affected individuals have notice of any such censorship so that they can be 
secured a meaningful opportunity to challenge the decision to censor in a judicial forum. As the Special Rapporteur’s Report 
explains: 
 
[A]ny limitation to the right to freedom of expression must ... be provided by law, which is clear and accessible 
to everyone (principles of predictability and transparency) ....129 
 
Building upon this requirement, the European Court of Human Rights in its recent Yildirim decision set forth the requirement 
that any legislation mandating Internet blocking or filtering provide, at a minimum, notification of the blocking order and the 
grounds for it to the person or institution affected.130 Filtering systems that do not require that the affected parties be made 
aware of filtering decisions--such as that employed by the IWF131--fail this threshold requirement. 
  
Countries implementing nationwide filtering systems to restrict their citizens’ access to content that they deem harmful 
should at the very least operate these systems in an open and transparent manner, in which the restrictions on speech are 
provided by law and are clear and accessible to everyone, to adhere to the principles of predictability and transparency 
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articulated in the ICCPR and in prior restraint jurisprudence. These systems should operate in a manner such that (1) Internet 
users are made aware of the operation of such filtering systems generally, and (2) affected users-- both content providers and 
would-be end users--are specifically informed of instances in which the filters operate to block access to a particular website. 
Only then can affected content providers and end users have the meaningful notice necessary to challenge the decision to 
censor. 
  
C. Categories of Prohibited Speech Should Be Clearly and Precisely Defined 
A third procedural requirement for nationwide Internet filtering systems is that the censor’s discretion be meaningfully 
constrained by clearly defined and precise criteria specifying what content is illegal.132 This requirement serves to cabin and 
constrain the discretion of the initial censors and require that the censors adhere to the legal determination of what content is 
proscribable.133 While countries may reasonably differ in their determinations of what categories of speech are illegal content-
-pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial, etc.--it is important that, within each country, the definitions of illegal speech 
subject to prior restraint be carefully and precisely defined so as to constrain the initial censor’s discretion. The Special 
Rapporteur has articulated the requirement that any restrictions on Internet speech be set forth by laws that are precise and 
clear, so that Internet users can reasonably predict how the law will apply to their content.134 Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
strictly cabined the discretion of censors in systems of prior restraint and has rejected as unconstitutional any systems that 
reposit unbounded discretion to determine whether or not speech is protected.135 For example, in Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a parade permitting system that vested the City Commission with 
the broad discretion to deny parade permits in cases where “in [the Commission’s] judgment the public welfare, peace, 
safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that [the parade permit] be refused.”136 In ruling on a 
challenge to the statute, the Court held that, because the permitting scheme constituted a prior restraint on expression that 
conferred “virtually unbridled and absolute power” on the Commission, it failed to comport with the essential due process 
requirement that any law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must embody 
“narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.”137 
  
Furthermore, requiring that the criteria by which the censoring authority makes the decision to censor be set forth with 
precision helps to cabin administrative discretion and also helps to limit “mission creep” within the censoring body. Without 
a precise and detailed specification of the criteria for censorship, the censor can exercise unbridled and expansive discretion 
to restrict speech. 
  
The IWF fails to provide meaningful constraints on its decision to blacklist a website. While its website purports to specify 
the criteria used by the IWF in blacklisting websites, the links to such criteria are broken.138 Further, the current IWF mandate 
seems to be susceptible to the problem of mission creep. Although its initial mission was solely to reduce the availability of 
images of child sexual abuse, the target of its censorship has now been extended beyond child pornography to encompass 
adult content that is ““criminally obscene,” and has at times been extended to encompass hate speech and “incitement to 
racial hatred content.”139 Further, it has yet to be specified precisely what content will fall within the definition of “family-
unfriendly” content under Prime Minister Cameron’s recently-announced expansion of the United Kingdom’s nationwide 
filtering system. It is unclear how the definitions of “family-friendly” and “family-unfriendly” content will be formulated and 
who will get to make the decisions regarding what content will be allowed and what content will be blocked. Such categories 
of family-unfriendly speech--which will apparently include such vague and ill-defined subcategories as “esoteric material”140-
-present the danger of enabling the censors to block whatever speech they choose, without meaningful constraints on their 
discretion. 
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, state-mandated Internet filtering systems--the likes of which are now being imposed by over forty countries 
worldwide, including liberal democracies like the United Kingdom--embody prior restraints on speech, which violate the due 
process requirements inherent in the free speech guarantee absent the inclusion of fundamental process-based safeguards 
embodied in both U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence and in the developing free speech jurisprudence under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. These free speech due 
process requirements mandate that such prior restraints implemented by filtering systems be implemented in an open and 
transparent manner, such that affected Internet users and content providers are provided with information that content was 
blocked and the reason for such blocking; that any restraints on speech are imposed subject to clear and precise definitions of 
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the speech to be regulated; and such that affected Internet users are provided with the opportunity to appeal any such 
blocking decisions, to an independent judicial body. Only such “sensitive tools” for distinguishing between protected and 
unprotected speech can adequately protect individuals’ free speech rights. 
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